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Abstract
In the manuscript titled “Computation environment (1)”, we introduced a notion called
computation environment as an interactive model for computation and complexity the-
ory. In this model, Turing machines are not autonomous entities and find their meanings
through the interaction between a computist and a universal processor, and thus due
to evolution of the universal processor, the meanings of Turing machines could change.
In this manuscript, we discuss persistently evolutionary intensions. We introduce a new
semantics, called persistently evolutionary semantics, for predicate logic that the mean-
ing of function and predicate symbols are not already predetermined, and predicate and
function symbols find their meaning through the interaction of the subject with the lan-
guage. In (classic) model theory, the mathematician who studies a structure is assumed
as a god who lives out of the structure, and the study of the mathematician does not
effect the structure. The meaning of predicate and function symbols are assumed to be
independent of the mathematician who does math. The persistently evolutionary se-
mantics could be regarded as a start of “Interactive Model Theory” as a new paradigm
in model theory (similar to the paradigm of interactive computation). In interactive
model theory, we suppose that a mathematical structure should consist of two parts:
1) an intelligent agent (a subject), and 2) an environment (language), and every things
should find its meaning through the interaction of these two parts.
We introduce persistently evolutionary Kripke structure for propositional and predi-
cate logic. Also, we propose a persistently evolutionary Kripke semantics for the notion
of computation, where the intension of a code of a Turing machine persistently evolve.
We show that in this Kripke model the subject can never know P = NP.
Keywords: Interactive Model Theory, Free will, Persistent Evolution.
1 Introduction
The human being interacts with its surrounded environment, and through this interaction,
the environment finds its meaning for him. He percepts its environment (that he calls it
the real world) through its sensors, and in order to understand it, he constructs mental
symbolic forms [4], and formal structures in his mind. After that, he reasons about its
environment through these mental constructions.
Euclidian Geometry, Ptolemy’s Almagset, Copernicus revolution, Turing computation,
and etc are some few samples of theories constructed by the human being through interaction
with the world.
After the human being constructs a formal theory, he observes and means its environ-
ment through it as a window to the outer world. He proposes questions about its environ-
ment in his (constructed mental) formal theory, and tries to answer them in the context of
the same theory. For example, in astronomy, after Ptolemy’s Almagset, the human being
tried to find an explanation for the irregular motions of the wandering stars in the con-
text of Ptolemy’s Almagset, and in geometry the human being attempted to prove parallel
postulate using Euclid’s first four postulates.
Model theory, a branch of mathematical logic [6], studies mathematical structure in
order to determine that given a theory (a set of formulas) Γ, which other formulas are true
in all structures which all formulas in Γ are true in them. In (classic) model theory, the
mathematician is regarded as a god who lives out of a mathematical structure, and thinking
activities of the mathematician does not effect the structure. In this way, the role of the
human being in developing formal systems is ignored. In this paper, we introduce a new
semantics for predicate logic, that the meaning of predicate and function symbols are not
already predetermined, and they find their meaning through the interaction of a subject
with the logical language. We name the proposed semantics “the persistently evolutionary
semantics”.
The paper is organized as follows:
In Section 2, We discuss persistently evolutionary intensions. We scrutinize that whether
it is possible that the intension of a word persistently evolves whereas the subject cannot
be aware of it.
In section 3, we propose persistently evolutionary Kripke semantics to formalize the notion
of persistently evolutionary intensions.
In section 4, and section 5, we introduce persistently evolutionary semantics for proposi-
tional and predicate logic.
In section 6, using persistently evolutionary semantics for predicate logic, we formalize the
argument of section 7 of the manuscript [7].
2 Persistently Evolutionary Intensions
The human being, as an intelligent agent, uses languages to express and encode the inten-
sions (concepts) that he constructs to mean his environment. Intension refers to a property
that specifies the set of all possible things that a word (a finite string) could describe, while
extension refers to the set of all actual things the word describes. Also an intensional def-
inition of a set of objects is to intend the set by a word, and an extensional definition of
a set of objects is by listing all objects. Obviously, it is impossible to give an extensional
definition for an infinite set. For example, the human being intends an infinite subset of
natural numbers by the word “prime”, and he can never list all prime numbers. As another
example, the human being, to define the set of all Turing machines has no way except to
use the intensional definition.
In theory of computation, for every Turing machine T , L(T ) refers to the set of all
strings that the Turing machine T halts for them. We may say the Turing machine T is
an intensional definition for the set L(T ), or in other words, the human being intends the
set L(T ) by the word (finite string) T (note that Turing machines can be coded in finite
strings).
The human being constructs concepts to mean its environment through them. It is
possible that both the human being and its environment (the real world, the nature) evolve
as the human being checks that whether an object is an extension of a word. This evolution
could be persistent such that the nature (or the human being) works well-defined. That is,
if an output z is already provided for an input [x, y] (x is a word, and y is a thing in order
to be checked whether it is an extension of x) then whenever in future, the same input [x, y]
are chosen, the output would be the same z. In other words, the meaning of the word x may
change, but in a conservative manner, that is, all the things that the human being already
realized that whether they are extensions of x or not, their status remains unchanged.
Definition 2.1 Let w be a word (a finite string), and O a domain of objects. We say
the intension of the word w for a subject is persistently evolutionary (or its extension is
order-sensitive) whenever in the course that the subject chooses an object o ∈ O to check
that whether it is an extension of the word w or not, then the intension of w changes, but
persistently, i.e., if the agent (the subject) has checked whether an object d is an extension
of w already, and the answer has been yes (has been no), then whenever in future the agent
checks again whether the same object d is an extension, the answer would be the same
yes (would be the same no). What remains unchanged is the word w (the syntax), but its
meaning (the semantics) changes for the subject. In this way, the set of all extensions of
the word w is not predetermined and it depends on the order that the agent chooses objects
from the domain O to check whether they are extensions of w or not.
Q1) Is it possible that an intension of a word would be a persistently evolutionary one?
The answer is Yes. To answer the above question, we should first clarify what the meaning
(the intension) of a word is? For a subject (the human being) the meaning of a word is
given by how the subject interacts via the word with the environment (the language). This
interaction is nothing except choosing objects and checking whether they are extensions of
the word.
Wittgenstein says the meaning of a word is identified by how it is used.
“For a large class of cases-though not for all- in which we employ the word
‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the lan-
guage” 1
The use of a word happens in time, therefore we may say that the meaning of a word exists
in time, and it is an unfinished entity similar to a choice sequence [1]. The meaning of
a word is not predetermined, and as time passes the word finds its meaning through the
interaction of the subject with the language. The meaning is a dynamic temporal (mental)
construction 2. In Brouwer’s intuitionism, mathematical objects are mental construction.
Brouwer’s choice sequences, as a kind of mathematical objects, are dynamic temporal ob-
jects (see page 16, [2]). The meaning of a word (which is identified via how it is used by
the human being) has lots of common with a choice sequence. At each stage of time, the
human being only experienced a finite set of things that whether they are extensions of
the word or not. Also, in a choice sequence, at each stage of time only a finite segment
1The quote is written from Stanford Encyclopeida of Philosophy [3].
2An object is temporal exactly if it exists in time, and it is dynamic if at some moments are part added
to it or removed from it [2], page 16. Another philosophical framework that knows possible the evolution
of a meaning is “dynamic Semantics” (see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dynamic-semantics/). In this
framework, meaning is context change potential.
of the sequence is determined. As the human being freely chooses another thing to check
its extension status for the word, the meaning of the word may persistently change (the
construction of the human’s brain (or mind) may persistently change). It is similar to the
act of the human being in developing a choice sequence.
The use of a word is dependent to the human being and the way that he uses (interacts
via) the word in (with) the environment. We may assume that the human being has freedom
to choose things in any order that he wants to check their status of being extensions of a
word. The different order of choosing objects may cause that the meaning of the word
evolves in different ways. But since the human being cannot go back to the past, he just
lives in one way of evolution. As soon as the human being chooses an object and checks
whether it is an extension of a word w, (the biological construction of) his mind may
persistently evolve, and the meaning of the word w persistently changes. Therefore, it
seems possible that the intension of a word would be persistently evolutionary, and
the interaction of the human being with the language may make the meaning
of a word persistently evolve. Assuming the free will for the human being, the
behavior of the human being is not predetermined, and as a consequence the
meaning of a word needs not to be predetermined.
Q2) Is it possible for a subject to distinguish between persistently evolutionary intensions
and static ones? In other words, is it possible for a subject to determine that whether
the intension of a word is static or persistently evolutionary?
The answer is No. It is not possible for the human being to recognize whether the meaning
of a word, in the course of his thinking activities, persistently evolves or remains constant.
Suppose w be a word. Two cases are possible
1) the intension of the word w is static and
2) the intension of the word w is persistently evolutionary.
In both cases, at each stage of time, the human being just has experienced the status
of extension of a finite set of objects. The human being just has access to his pervious
experiences and does not have access to the future. So at each stage of time, all information
that the human being has about the word w is a finite set of objects {d1, d2, ..., dn} that
their extension status are determined. This information of the word w are the same in both
cases.
The human being cannot differ between these two cases based on his obtained informa-
tion. The persistent evolution is similar to being static in view of past experiences. The
difference of the persistent evolution and being static is in future. But the human being
does not have access to the future. As soon as, the meaning of a word evolves then it has
been evolved and the subject cannot go back to the past and experience another way of
evolution.
Example 2.2 Suppose that I am in a black box with two windows: an input window and
an output one. You give natural numbers as input to the black box and receive a natural
numbers as output of the black box. I do the following strategy in the black box. I plan to
output 1 for each input before You give the black box 5 or 13 as inputs. If you give 5 as
input (and you have not given 13 already) then after that time, I output 2 for all future
inputs that have not been already given to the black box. For those natural numbers that you
have already given them as input, I still output the same 1. If you give 13 as input (and you
have not given 5 already) then after that time, I output 3 for all future inputs that have not
been already given to the black box. For those natural numbers that you have already given
them as input, I still output the same 1.
The black box of the above example behaves well defined. But it persistently evolve through
interactions with the environment, and the function that the black box provides is not a
predetermined function. If one does not have access to the inner structure of the black box,
he could always assume that there exists a a static machine in the black box.
Remark 2.3 Deterministic vs. Predetermination. Being deterministic does not
force to be predetermined. The human may computationally intend a function determinis-
tically, but it is not needed that the language to be predetermined. It may be determined as
time passes by the free will of the human being.
We propose a postulate about the extension of a word as follows: Suppose w is a word and
O is a class of objects. We refer to the set of extension of w by E(w) ⊆ O. Our proposed
postulate which we call it ”the Postulate of Persistent Evolution”, PPE, says:
PPE: if a subject has not yet proved that E(w) is finite (or in other words, if a subject has
not yet listed all the element of E(w) on paper) then he could not yet disprove that
the meaning (intension) of w does not persistently evolve.
Suppose that a subject wants to prove that
i. the meaning of a word w is static and does not persistently evolve, and
ii. the set E(w) is predetermined and does not depend to the order that he chooses
objects from the domain O to check whether they are extensions of w or not.
The subject at each stage of time, only knows the status of a finite number of objects
in O that whether they are extensions of w or not. Suppose E(w) is infinite. Then the
subject has never written all extensions of w at any stage of time. He always could know it
possible that the the meaning of the word w may persistently change. But since this change
happens persistently, he cannot recognize whether the meaning is static or not, based on
the finite history that he has access to it.
If a subject does not sense a change about a process, then he may (wrongly)
presuppose that the process is static and independent of his interaction with
the process. In spite of this, in the case that a process persistently evolves, the
subject does not sense any change as well! We only sense a change whenever we
discover that an event which has been sensed before is not going to be sensed
similar to past. Persistent evolution always respects the past. As soon as a
subject experiences an event, then whenever in future he examines the same
event, he will experience it similar to past. Persistent evolution effects the
future which has not been determined yet.
In other words, the postulate PPE says that
it is not possible for a subject to differ between static intensions and persistently
evolutionary one.
3 Persistently Evolutionary Semantics
In this section, to clarify the notion of persistently evolutionary intensions, we introduce a
kind of Kripke structures that we name Persistently Evolutionary Kripke structures.
Let P = {pi | i ∈ I} be a set of atomic propositional formulas for an index set I ⊆ N,
and A = {ai | i ∈ I
′} (I ′ ⊆ N is an index set) be a set that is assumed as the set of actions
of an agent ag.
Definition 3.1 A Persistently Evolutionary Kripke structure over a set of actions A and
a set of atomic formulas P is a tuple K = 〈S,Π = {πj | j ∈ J},∼ag, V 〉 where J ⊆ N is an
index set, and
• S = A∗ × J is the set of all possible worlds (A∗ is the set of all finite sequences of
actions in A). For each s = (~x, i) ∈ S, we call i the meaning index of the state s.
• Π is the set of meaning functions. Each πi ∈ Π (i ∈ J), is a partial function from
S × A to FP (the set of finite subsets of P ) that its domain is (A∗ × {i}) × A. To
each state s = (〈b1, b2, ..., bn〉, i), and each action a ∈ A the function πi corresponds
a finite subset of P as the meaning of the action a, satisfying the following condition
(persistently evolutionary condition):
for each state s = (〈b1, b2, ..., bn〉, i) ∈ S, if an action a is appeared in the finite se-
quence 〈b1, b2, ..., bn〉, and 〈b1, b2, ..., bn〉 = 〈b1, b2, ..., bi〉〈a〉〈bi+2, ..., bn〉, then πi(s, a) =
πi((〈b1, b2, ..., bi〉, i), a).
• The agent ag is an operator which chooses actions from A and performs them. By
his operation, it makes the universe evolve. If s = (~x, i) ∈ S is the current state of
the model K and ag performs a ∈ A, then the current world evolves to s′ = (~x.〈a〉, i).
Note that via evolution, the meaning index of the states does not change. We say
the agent ag lives in the meaning function πi, or in other words, the actual meaning
function for the agent ag is πi.
• V is a function form S to 2P defined as follows: for each s ∈ S, s = (〈b1, b2, ..., bn〉, j),
V (s) = πj((〈〉, j), b1) ∪ (
⋃
1≤i≤n πj((〈b1, b2, ..., bi〉, j), bi+1)).
• ∼ag⊆ S × S is a binary relation which satisfies the following condition: for all two
states s1, s2 ∈ S, we have s1 ∼ag s2 whenever s1 = (~x, i) and s2 = (~x, j) for some
~x = 〈x1, x2, ..., xk〉 and i, j ∈ J such that for all 1 ≤ t ≤ k, πi((〈x1, ..., xt−1〉, i), xt) =
πj((〈x1, ..., xt−1〉, j), xt).
The relation ∼ag is an indistinguishability relation for the agent ag. If s1 ∼ag s2 then it
means that the agent ag cannot distinguish between these two states, since all experiences
that he has observed in both states are the same.
Definition 3.2 Let K = 〈S,Π = {πj | j ∈ J},∼ag, V 〉 be a persistently evolutionary Kripke
Structure. We say a meaning function πi ∈ Π is static if it is not order-sensitive. That is,
for every n ∈ N, for every a1, a2, ..., an, a ∈ A, for every permutation δ : {1...n} → {1...n},
πi((〈aδ(1), aδ(2), ..., aδ(n)〉, i), a) = πi((〈a1, a2, ..., an〉, i), a).
Notation 3.3 For each state s = (~x, i), we let D(s) = {s′ | s′ = (~y, i), ~x is a prefix of ~y}.
Definition 3.4 Let K = 〈S,Π = {πj | j ∈ J},∼ag, V 〉 be a persistently evolutionary Kripke
Structure. Suppose s = (~a, i), ~a ∈ A∗, and i ∈ J be a current state that the agent ag lives in.
We may say that the agent ag can never become conscious that whether his world is static
or persistently evolutionary whenever for every s′ = (~a, i) ∈ D(s) there exists a meaning
function πj ∈ Π which is not static, and for s
′′ = (~a, j), we have s′ ∼ag s
′′.
Definition 3.5 Let P be a non-empty set of propositional variables. The language L(P ) is
the smallest superset of P such that
if ϕ,ψ ∈ L(P ) then ¬ϕ, (ϕ ∧ ψ), (ϕ ∨ ψ), (ϕ→ ψ),Kagϕ,ϕ,Cfϕ ∈ L(P ),,
Cfϕ has to be read as “the formula ϕ conflicts with the free will of the agent ag”, Kagϕ has
to be read as “the agent ag knows ϕ”, and ϕ has to be read as “ϕ is necessary true”.
Notation 3.6 Let K be a Kripke model with the set of state S. For each subset A ⊆ S,
KA is defined to be the same Kripke model K which its set of states is restricted to the set
A.
Definition 3.7 In order to determine whether a formula ϕ ∈ L(P ) is true in a current
world (K, s), denoted by (K, s) |= ϕ, we look at the structure of ϕ:
(K, s) |= p iff p ∈ V (s)
(K, s) |= (ϕ ∨ ψ) iff (K, s) |= ϕ or (K, s) |= ψ
(K, s) |= (ϕ→ ψ) iff for all t ∈ D(s), if(K, t) |= ϕ then (K, t) |= ψ
(K, s) |= (ϕ ∧ ψ) iff (K, s) |= ϕ and (K, s) |= ψ
(K, s) |= ¬ϕ iff for all t ∈ D(s), (K, t) 6|= ϕ
(K, s) |= ϕ iff for all t ∈ D(s), (K, t) |= ϕ
(K, s) |= Kagϕ iff for all t ∈ S, if t ∼ag s then (K, t) |= ϕ
(K, s) |= Cfϕ iff there exsits an infinite set Path = {s0, s1, ...},
where s0 = s, and for each i, si+1 ∈ D(si) and (KPath, si) 6|= ϕ
The current state of the Kripke model K is not a fixed state. The current state evolves
due to agent’s operation, and it is not possible for the agent to travel back in time from
a state s to one of its prefixes. Note that during the evolution, the meaning function does
not change. That is, if the current state is s = (~x, i) and due to executing an action a, the
current state changes to be s′, then s′ = (~x.〈a〉, i) for the same i. In this case, we call πi
the actual meaning function of the universe.
The semantics of Cfϕ says that the agent ag can interact with the universe and evolve
it in a way that never ϕ holds true. Therefore, the assumption of truth of ϕ conflicts with
the free will of the agent.
Definition 3.8 Let K = 〈S,Π,∼ag, V 〉 be a persistently evolutionary Kripke structure.
We say an action a ∈ A, at the state s = (~x, i) ∈ S, is a static action whenever for all
s1, s2 ∈ D(s) , we have πi(s1, a) = πi(s2, a). That is, if the agent starts from the state s to
perform actions, then the different orders that he may perform the actions does not make
the meaning of the action ‘a’ change.
Remark 3.9 At each state, the agent cannot go back to past to experience his universe in
different ways, thus he cannot distinguish between static actions and persistently evolution-
ary ones.
Example 3.10 Suppose A = N as a set of actions, and P = {pi,j | i, j ∈ N} as a set of
atomic propositions. For each finite sequence of numbers ~x = 〈x1, x2, ..., xn〉, and y ∈ A,
if for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, xi 6= 5,xi 6= 13, define π(~x, y) = {py,1}
if for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, xi = 5 and for all j < i xj 6= 13 then
– if for some t ≤ min({i|xi = 5}), y = xt then define π(~x, y) = {py,1} else define
π(~x, y) = {py,2}.
if for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, xi = 13 and for all j < i xj 6= 5 then
– if for some t ≤ min({i|xi = 13}), y = xt then define π(~x, y) = {py,1} else define
π(~x, y) = {py,3}.
The function π satisfies the persistently evolutionary condition. We have (K, 〈1, 3〉) |= p1,1.
Also (K, 〈1, 3〉) |= Cfp6,1, and (K, 〈1, 3〉) |= Cf¬p6,1. The value of p6,1 is not predetermined
yet and depends on the free will of the agent.
One may check that the indistinguishability relation ∼ag is
1) reflexive (for all s ∈ S, s ∼ag s);
2) transitive (for all s, t, u ∈ S, if s ∼ag t and t ∼ag u then s ∼ag u);
3) Euclidean (for all three states s, t, u ∈ S if s ∼ag t and s ∼ag u then t ∼ag u).
Therefore, persistently evolutionary Kripke structures are models for the standard epistemic
logic S5 [5] which consists of axioms A1 − A5 and the derivation rules R1 and R2 given
below
A1: Axioms of propositional logic
A2: (Kϕ ∧K(ϕ→ ψ))→ Kψ
A3: Kϕ→ ϕ
A4: Kϕ→ KKϕ
A5: ¬Kϕ→ K¬Kϕ
R1: ⊢ ϕ, ⊢ ϕ→ ψ ⇒ ⊢ ψ
R2: ⊢ ϕ⇒ Kϕ,
3.1 A Kripke Model for Persistently Evolutionary Intensions
Now we describe the notion of persistently evolutionary intensions using persistently evo-
lutionary Kripke models.
Let Language = {w1, w2, ...} be a set of words for a subject IA, and X = {x1, x2, ...}
be an infinite set of objects that could be assumed as possible extensions of words in
Language.
The subject chooses a word w ∈ Language and an object x ∈ X to check whether x
is an extension of the word w or not. Therefore, the set of actions of the Kripke model is
defined to be Ae = {(wi, xj) | i, j ∈ N}. The set of atomic propositions is defined to be
Pe = {p(wi,xj ,0) | i, j ∈ N} ∪ {p(wi,xj ,1) | i, j ∈ N}.
The agent IA chooses a word wi and an object xj to check whether xj is an extension
of the word wi. If at state s, he chooses (wi, xj) then the current state evolves to s
′ =
s.〈(wi, xj)〉.
We let the set of meaning functions Πe to be the set of all functions πis which satisfy
the following conditions:
1- For each state s = (~x, i), and action (wi, xj) either πi(s, (wi, xj)) = p(wi,xj ,1) (we read
it as “at the current state s, the agent IA checked that whether xj is an extension of
the word wi and found out the answer ‘yes’) or πi(s, (wi, xj)) = p(wi,xj ,0) (we read it
as “at the current state s, the agent IA checked that whether xj is an extension of
the word wi and found out the answer ‘no’).
2- Each πi ∈ Π satisfies the persistently evolutionary condition.
We call the Kripke model Ke = (Se,Πe,∼ag, Ve) (introduced above) the model of per-
sistently evolutionary intensions.
Definition 3.11 We say the intension of a word w ∈ Language is static (or its extension
is not order-sensitive) at a state s = (~x, j) whenever for all a ∈ {(w, xi) | i ∈ N} and for all
s1 and s2 in D(s), we have πj(s1, a) = πj(s2, a).
Theorem 3.12 For each state s = (~x, j) ∈ Se and each word w ∈ Language there exist
two states s1 = (~x, t) ∈ Se and s2 = (~x, t) ∈ Se such that s ∼ag s1 and s ∼ag s2, and the
intension of w is static at s1, and persistently evolutionary at s2.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. ⊣
The above theorem says that it is not possible for the agent who lives in the persistently
evolutionary Kripke model Ke to gets aware that whether the intension of a word w is static
or persistently evolutionary. It is because, at each stage of time (at each state of the Kripke
model Ke) the agent only observed a finite set of experiences, and as he cannot travel to
the past (go back to a prefix of the current state), he cannot experience different orders of
his behavior to be assure that if the actual meaning function which the universe evolves in,
is order-sensitive or not.
If the agent wants to be aware of a change, then he must experience an event
different from the way that he has experienced the same event already. But as
the evolution happens persistently, it is impossible.
In persistently evolution, the behavior of the agent changes the future which has not yet
occurred.
4 Persistently Evolutionary Semantics for Propositional Logic
Persistently evolutionary Kripke structures can be considered as models for propositional
logic. Let Pl = {pi | i ∈ I} be a set of atomic formulas. The language Ll of propositional
logic is the smallest set containing Pl satisfying the following condition:
φ,ψ ∈ L⇒ ϕ ∧ ψ,ϕ ∨ ψ,¬ϕ,ϕ→ ψ,Kϕ,Cfϕ,ϕ ∈ Ll.
We say K = 〈S,Π,∼ag , V 〉 is a Kripke structure for propositional logic whenever the set of
actions is A = Pl, the set of atomic formulas of the structure K is P = {p = b | p ∈ Pl, b ∈
{0, 1}}, and for each πi ∈ Π, πi((〈p1, p2, ..., pn〉, i), p) = {p = b} for some b ∈ {0, 1}.
Definition 4.1 For every formula ϕ ∈ Ll, we define
(K, s) |= p iff p = 1 ∈ V (s)
(K, s) |= (ϕ ∨ ψ) iff (K, s) |= ϕ or (K, s) |= ψ
(K, s) |= (ϕ→ ψ) iff for all t ∈ D(s), if(K, t) |= ϕ then (K, t) |= ψ
(K, s) |= (ϕ ∧ ψ) iff (K, s) |= ϕ and (K, s) |= ψ
(K, s) |= ¬ϕ iff for all t ∈ D(s), (K, t) 6|= ϕ
(K, s) |= Kagϕ iff for all t ∈ S, if t ∼ag s then (K, t) |= ϕ
K, s) |= ϕ iff for all t ∈ D(s), (K, t) |= ϕ
(K, s) |= Cfϕ iff there exsits an infinite set Path = {s0, s1, ...},
where s0 = s, and for each i, si+1 ∈ D(si) and (KPath, si) 6|= ϕ
One may check that if we omit the operator K, , and Cf from the language Ll then
the persistently evolutionary semantics is sound and complete for intuitionistic propositional
logic (see Chapter 2, [8]).
5 Persistently Evolutionary Semantics for Predicate Logic
In this part, we propose a persistently evolutionary semantics for predicate logic.
A predicate language Lo contains
• a set of predicate symbols R, and a natural number nR for each R ∈ R as its ary,
• a set of function symbols F , and a natural number nf for each f ∈ F ,
• a set of constant symbols C.
Definition 5.1 A partial Lo-structure N is given by the following data
1) a nonempty set N called the domain,
2) a partial function fN : Nnf → N , for each f ∈ F ,
3) a set RN ⊆ NnR for each R ∈ R,
4) a partial zero-ary function cN ∈ N for each c ∈ C. (In this way, there could be some
constant symbols c ∈ C, which are not interpreted in the structure.)
We refer to RN , fN , cN as interpretations of symbols R, f, c.
Definition 5.2 TERM is the smallest set containing
variable symbols,
constants symbols in C,
for each function symbol f ∈ F , if t1, t2, ..., tnf ∈ TERM then f(t1, t2, ..., tnf ) is a
term.
The interpretation of a term t, denoted by tN is defined to be a partial function fromNk toN
for some k, similar to the interpretation of terms in model theory (see definition 1.1.4 of [6]).
The only difference is that the interpretations are partial functions.
Definition 5.3 FORMULA is the smallest set satisfying the following conditions:
⊥∈ Formula,
t1, t2 ∈ TERM then t1 = t2 ∈ FORMULA,
for each predicate symbol R ∈ R, if t1, t2, ..., tnR ∈ TERM then R(t1, t2, ..., tnR) ∈
FORMULA
ϕ,ψ ∈ FORMULA then ¬ϕ,ϕ ∧ ψ,ϕ ∨ ψ,ϕ→ ψ,∀yϕ,∃yϕ ∈ FORMULA.
A persistently evolutionary Kripke structure KLo for the language Lo is defined as follows:
- a nonempty set O called the domain,
- The set of actions of the Kripke structure is
AO = {R(~o) | ~o ∈ O
nR , R ∈ R}∪
{f(~o) | ~o ∈ Onf , f ∈ F}∪
{c | c ∈ C}.
The set of atomic propositions of the Kripke structure is
PO = {(R(~o) = b) | b ∈ {0, 1}, ~o ∈ O
nR , R ∈ R}∪
{(f(~o) = o′) | ~o ∈ Onf , o′ ∈ O, f ∈ F}∪
{(cj = o) | c ∈ C, o ∈ O}.
The set of meaning functions Π of the Kripke structure is the set of all functions πi,
which satisfy persistently evolutionary condition and
π(s,R(~o)) = {(R(~o) = b)} for some b ∈ {0, 1}, and
π(s, f(~o)) = {(f(~o) = o′)} for some o′ ∈ O.
π(s, c) = {(c = o)}, for some o ∈ O.
The meaning of predicates and the value of functions are not predetermined in the Kripke
structure. As soon as the agent ag chooses a predicate symbol R and a tuple (o1, o2, ..., onR)
to find the value of R(o1, o2, ..., onR), the meaning function gives out an atomic proposition
(R(o1, o2, ..., onR) = b), b ∈ {0, 1}, and the current state evolves to a new state.
Definition 5.4 Let s be a state of the persistently evolutionary Kripke model KLo . The
partial Lo-structure of the state s, denoted by Ns, is defined as follows:
1- the domain of the structure Ns is the same domain of the Kripke model O.
2- For each symbolic predicate R ∈ R, the relation RNs is defined to be {~o | (R(~o) = 1) ∈
V (s)}.
3- For each symbolic function f ∈ F , the partial function fNs is defined to be {(o, o′) |
(f(o) = o′) ∈ V (s)}.
4- For each symbolic constant c ∈ C, we define cNs = o if (c = o) ∈ V (s).
We say a constant c is predetermined at a state s whenever for some o ∈ O, cNs = o. We
say a predicate symbol R is predetermined for ~o at a state s, whenever for some b ∈ {0, 1},
(R(~o) = b) ∈ V (s). We say a function symbol f is predetermined for ~o at a state s, whenever
for some o′ ∈ O, fNs(~o) = o′. We simply can inductively define being predetermined for
terms and formulas.
Definition 5.5 Let KLo = 〈S,Π = {πi | i ∈ I}, V 〉 be a persistently evolutionary Kripke
structure for the language Lo. Let s be a state of this model. Also let φ be a formula with
free variables ~y = (y1, y2, ..., yn), and let ~o = (o1, o2, ..., on) ∈ O
n. We inductively define
(K, s) |= ϕ(~o) as follows.
- if φ is t1 = t2, then (K, s) |= φ(~o) iff t
Ns
1 (~o) = t
Ns
2 (~o),
if φ is R(t1, t2, ..., tnR), then (K, s) |= φ(~o) iff (t
Ns
1 (~o), t
Ns
2 (~o), ..., t
Ns
nR
(~o)) ∈ RNs,
if φ is ¬ψ, then (K, s) |= φ(~o) iff for all w ∈ D(s), w 6|= ψ(~o),
if φ is ϕ→ ψ, then (K, s) |= φ(~o) iff for all w ∈ D(s), w |= ϕ(~o), then w |= ψ(~o),
if φ is ϕ ∧ ψ, then (K, s) |= φ(~o) iff s |= ϕ(~o), and s |= ψ(~o),
if φ is ϕ ∨ ψ, then (K, s) |= φ(~o) iff s |= ϕ(~o), or s |= ψ(~o),
if φ is ∀xψ(~y, x), then (K, s) |= φ(~o) iff for all w ∈ D(s), for all o′ ∈ O, if ψ(~o, o′) is
defined in the partial structure Nw (predetermined at the state w) then w |= ψ(~o, o
′),
if φ is ∃xψ(~y, x), then (K, s) |= φ(~o) iff there exists o′ ∈ O, s |= ψ(~o, o′).
Proposition 5.6 For every formula ϕ ∈ Lo, and every state (K, s), if (K, s) |= ϕ then for
all s′ ∈ D(s), (K, s′) |= ϕ.
Proof. It is straightforward. ⊣
5.1 Free Will
One of our purpose of proposing persistently evolutionary semantics is to provide a frame-
work to formalize the notion of free will. We discussed the notion of free will in section 4.3
of [7]. In this part, we repeat the same discussion using persistently evolutionary Kripke
structures.
Let R be a a one-ary predicate symbol. Let O = {0, 1}∗ be the set of all finite strings over
0 and 1. Consider the meaning function πj as follows: for s = (〈R(x1), R(x2), ..., R(xk)〉, j),
and x ∈ {0, 1}∗,
• if for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k, x = xi then πj(s,R(x)) is defined to be πj(s
′, R(xi)) for
s′ = (〈R(x1), R(x2), ..., R(xi−1)〉, j),
• if for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, x 6= xi, and there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ k, such that xi = x0 or
xi = x1 and for s
′ = (〈R(x1), R(x2), ..., R(xi−1)〉, j), πj(s
′, R(xi)) = {R(xi) = 1} then
πj(s,R(x)) is defined to be {(R(x) = 0)},
• otherwise, πj(s,R(x)) is defined to be {(R(x) = 1)},
It is easy to check that the meaning function πj behaves similar to the persistently evolu-
tionary Turing machine PT1 introduced in example 4.6 in [7]. The next theorem is a formal
version of the theorem 4.9 in [7]. Let K ′ be the persistently evolutionary Kripke model
which the set of its meaning function Π is {πj}.
Theorem 5.7 Let
ϕ := (∃k ∈ N)(∀n > k)(∃x ∈ {0, 1}∗)(|x| = n ∧R(x)).
We have for the initial state s = (〈〉, j),
(K ′, s) |= Cfϕ ∧Cf¬ϕ.
Proof. The agent can develop the future in two ways such if the first way happens ϕ is
true in the universe, but if the second happens ¬ϕ is true.
We define two ordering 1,2 on the elements of {0, 1}
∗ as follows. Let x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}
∗.
1- if |x1| < |x2| then x1 1 x2,
2- if |x1| = |x2| then
0 1 1,
if x1 1 x2 then x1a 1 x2a, for a ∈ {0, 1},
x10 1 x11.
, and
1- if |x1|+ 1 < |x2| then x1 2 x2,
2- if |x1| = |x2| then
x1 2 x2 iff x1 1 x2,
3- if |x1|+ 1 = |x2| and |x1| is even then x1 2 x2,
4- if if |x1|+ 1 = |x2| and |x1| is odd then x2 2 x1,
Now let y1, y2, ... be an enumeration of element of {0, 1}
∗ with respect of the ordering 1,
and z1, z2, ... be an enumeration of element of {0, 1}
∗ with respect of the ordering 2. For
each n ∈ N, let sn = (〈R(y1), R(y2), ..., R(yn)〉, j), and s′n = (〈R(z1), R(z2), ..., R(zn)〉, j).
Let Path1 = {s1, s2, ...}, and Path2 = {s
′
1, s
′
2, ...}. We are done. ⊣
Let (K, s) be an arbitrary state of a persistently evolutionary Kripke model. One may
easily observe that for all formula ψ, (K, s) |= Cfϕ→ ¬Kagψ. It is because if (K, s) |=
Cfψ then (K, s) 6|= ψ and thus (K, s) 6|= Kagψ.
Therefore, for the formula ϕ in theorem 5.7, we have (K ′, s) |= ¬Kagϕ∧¬Kag¬ϕ. It
says that the agent ag never have evidence for ϕ and never have evidence for ¬ϕ. Therefore
the principle of “from perpetual ignorance to negation” (PIN, see Chapter 5 of [1]) is not
true in persistently evolutionary Kripke models.
6 A Persistently Evolutionary Kripke Structure for Com-
putation environments
In this section, we propose a persistently evolutionary Kripke structure, Kce, for the notion
of computation environments. The language of computation environment Lce contains
• a predicate symbol SB for the successful box,
• a function symbol TB for the transition box.
Let INSTs and CONFs be two set introduced in the Turing computation environment (see
example 3.4 of [7]). The set of actions is defined to be
Ace = {SB(C) | C ∈ CONFs} ∪ {TB(C, ι) | C ∈ CONFs, ι ∈ INSTs}.
The set of atomic proposition of the Kripke structure Kce is defined to be
Pce = {SB(C) = b | b ∈ {0, 1}, C ∈ CONFs} ∪ {TB(C, ι) = C
′ | C,C ′ ∈ CONFs, ι ∈
INSTs}.
The set of meaning functions Πce is defined to be the set of all functions π which satisfy
persistently evolutionary condition, and for every s ∈ Sce, C = (q, xb1ab2y) ∈ CONFs, and
ι ∈ INSTs,
if π(s, SB(C)) = {SB(C) = 1} then either C = (h,△x) or C = (h, x△),
if C = (h,△x) then π(s, SB(C)) = {SB(C) = 1},
π(s, TB(C, ι)) = {TB(C, ι) = (p, xb1cb2y)} for τ = [(q, a)→ (p, c,R)],
π(s, TB(C, ι)) = {TB(C, ι) = (p, xb1cb2y)} for τ = [(q, a)→ (p, c, L)].
if τ 6= [(q, a)→ (p, c, L)] and τ 6= [(q, a)→ (p, c,R)] then π(s, TB(C, ι)) = {TB(C, ι) =⊥
}.
Let πi be the meaning function that behaves accord to SBOXs and TBOXs of the
Turing computation environment. We prove
(Kce, (〈〉, i)) |= ¬Kag(P = NP).
To do this, we should prove that for every finite sequence of actions ~a in Ace, there exists
a meaning function πj such that (~a, i) ∼ag (~a, j), and (Kce, (~a, j)) 6|= (P = NP).
Suppose ~a = 〈a1, a2, ..., an〉, and let H = {ai | ai = SB(h, x△)}. We construct a
meaning function πj that considers the following boxes. For the symbol function TB the
meaning function πj behaves based on the transition box TBOXs. For the symbol predicate
SB, it behaves as follows: We persistently evolve the persistently evolutionary machine
PT1 in the way that for every x ∈ Σ
∗, if there exists a configuration C = (h, x△)} such
that SB(C) ∈ H, then the machine PT1, after evolution, outputs 1 for x if and only if
πi((~a, i), SB(C)) = 1
3. Then we construct a successful box, denoted by SBOX ′, which its
inner structure is similar to SBOXe except that instead of the PT1 machine, we replaced
the above evolved PT1 machine. Now, we let πj be the meaning function that behaves
accord to SBOX ′. Then the two followings are straightforward.
1- (~a, i) ∼ag (~a, j), and
2- (Kce, (~a, j)) 6|= (P = NP)
One should verify that at the state (~a, j)), the formula P = NP conflicts with the free will of
the agent (see the proof of theorem 5.8 of [7]), and thus we have (Kce, (~a, j)) 6|= (P = NP).
Therefore,
(Kce, (〈〉, i)) |= ¬Kag(P = NP).
The finite sequence ~a was assumed to be arbitrary. Therefore, we proved that for all finite
sequence of actions ~a, (Kce, (〈〉, i)) |= ¬Kag(P = NP), and it informally means that
the agent ag can never know (have evidence for) P = NP.
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